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美國保台的能力究竟如何? —看美國人怎麼說台灣安全與台海和平直接影響台灣所有民眾的生命財產，是極其嚴肅的課題，務需廣挖深掘、實事求是，才能接近真相。本檔案全部取自英文資料，依公開時序排列，共 56 條，絕大部分來自美國國防部、國會、前任高階官員、及重要智庫。小部分才是個別專家學者的研究。對美國「力不足保台」的質疑是由長年接受美國政府委託、從事安全研究的蘭德公司於 2015 年率先提出。當即引起筆者的高度重視，並開始不時撰寫讀書心得，以略盡知識分子的言責。2019 年起，美國政府、智庫、及學者的警訊越來越頻密，內容越來越直白，今似已為美國政學媒界共識。國人不可不警惕。本中英文檔案均載於台北論壇網站〈http://www.taipeiforum.org.tw〉，敬請查閱。 1 Is The United States Capable of Protecting Taiwan? —See What the Americans Have Said Peace across the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan’s security are deadly serious issues impacting directly on the lives and properties of all the people on Taiwan. Hence it requires extensive, deep, and pragmatic studies to get to the true picture. All of the following 56 items are drawn from open sources in English language, the overwhelming majority being the reports made by the Pentagon, Congress, former senior officials, and major think tanks. Only a small minority are books and articles by individual scholars. They are arranged by the order they appeared in public. The first warning shot about the U.S. “less than fully capable of protecting Taiwan” appeared to have been fired by the RAND corporation, an esteemed think tank long devoted to security studies and mostly supported by U.S. Defense Department, in 2015. This study caught my attention immediately. To fulfill my role as a concerned intellectual, I have since written op-eds in Chinese from time to time -- and translated them into English for those who cared to read -- to elucidate the views and findings of those American officials and experts on this vital issue for the consumption of Taiwan’s public who have not been made aware of the harsh truth on this existential issue by the mass media. As seen from the list below, the frequency and sense of urgency evoked by their remarks have heightened unmistakably since 2019. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the alarmist view has become the main stream among the U.S. elites today. It therefore behooves the Taiwan public to sit up and pay attention. Both the Chinese and English versions are available at the website of Taipei Forum: 〈http://www.taipeiforum.org.tw〉 2 2015 Eric Heginbotham et al, The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power: 1996-2017 RAND Corporation “(The) Chinese submarine fleet has made major gains relative to U.S. defensive capabilities. Under any set of assumptions assessed within this model, the number of expected potential engagements by Chinese submarine against U.S. carriers increase by more than an order of magnitude (and in some cases, by more than 20 times) between 1997 and 2017 ... Given the cost, the number of personnel, and symbolic importance of U.S. aircraft carriers, this level of risk could prompt U.S. commanders to hold carriers back until areas close to China could be sanitized by U.S. anti-submarine assets.” (p. 197) “By 2017, further improvements across all areas of Chinese anti- surface warfare, especially submarine capabilities, led to China’s advantage in the Taiwan case ... the Chinese advantage refers only to the situation at the first few weeks of conflict ... critically important to, for example, a ground campaign in Taiwan...” (p. 200) “The analysis presented in this chapter indicates that while the U.S. maintains unparalleled military forces overall, it faces a progressively receding frontier of military dominance in Asia ... As a result, the balance of power between the U.S. and China may be approaching a series of tipping points, first, in contingencies close to the Chinese coast (e.g., Taiwan) and possibly later in more distant locations (e.g., the Spratly Islands) ... It is difficult to state with precision when these points might be reached, but a tipping point in a Taiwan conflict might come as early as 2020.” (p. 342) 3 2015 年 Eric Heginbotham(MIT 研究員，時任蘭德公司研究員)等 14 人美中軍事計分卡:軍力、地理與變遷中的實力對比:1996-2017 蘭德公司發表中共潛艦相對於美國戰力已有長足進步。根據本研究所用模型的任何假設，中共潛艦能與美國航母接戰的次數在 1997 到 2017 年間都成長了好多倍，在某些情況下甚至達到 20 倍之多...由於航母成本高、兵員多、象徵意義大，這種風險就使航母指揮官不願進入接近中國大陸的海域，除非先由反潛能量清掃一遍。(頁 197) 到 2017 年時，中國反艦作戰能力的全面提升，尤其是潛艦戰力，導致中共對台作戰的優勢...存在於戰事初始幾星期。這對攻台地面作戰極度重要。(頁 200) 本章以上分析顯示，美國軍力雖仍全球無敵，但在亞洲地區美國優勢的邊界線卻逐漸後縮...以致美中軍力對比正逼近一個又一個轉折點，先是離大陸最近的地方(像台灣)，其次是較遠的地方 (如南沙群島)...何時轉折點會出現，很難預測，但台海衝突的轉折點可能在 2020 就會到。(頁 342) 4 January 2016 Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Mark Garcia Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025: Capabilities, Presence, and Partnership: An Independent Review of U.S. Defense Strategy in the Asia-Pacific, Center for Strategic and International Studies “The reach of China’s A2/AD system is such that U.S. carrier-based assets will likely need to stay outside the most dangerous zones, at least during the initial phase of a conflict.” (p. 130) 2016 年 1 月 Michael Green(時任喬治城大學亞洲研究主任，曾任小布希政府國安會亞洲部門資深主任) Kathleen Hicks(曾任國防部副次長，時任戰略與國際研究中心國際安全計畫主持人，2021 出任國防部副部長，現為國防部最高女性官員) Mark Cancian(曾任職白宮管理與預算辦公室與國防部長辦公室)等 21 人亞太再平衡 2025:能力，存在，夥伴關係戰略與國際研究中心發表中共反介入/區域拒止能力已經達到美國航母必須停留在最危險海域以外的地步，起碼衝突初期必須如此。(頁 130) 5 2016 David Gompert, Astrid Struth Cevallos Cristina L. Gavafola War with China: Thinking through the Unthinkable RAND Corporation “War between the two countries could begin with devastating strikes; be hard to control; last months, if not years; have no winner; and inflict huge losses on both side military forces. The longer such a war would rage, the greater the importance of economic, political, and international effects. While such non-military effects could fall hardest on China, they could also greatly harm the U.S. economy and the U.S. ability to meet challenges worldwide.” (p. xvii) 2016 年 David Gomper(曾任國家情報副總監、代理總監) 等3人與中國的戰爭:想像不能想像的蘭德公司報告美中戰爭可能以相互痛擊開始;一開始就難控制;就算不持續幾年，也有好幾個月;並對雙方軍事力量造成嚴重損失。戰爭持續越久，經濟、政治、及國際效應越重大。這些非軍事效應雖對中國傷害較大，但也會重創美國經濟及其因應全球其他挑戰的能力。(頁 xvii) 6 June 2017 Thomas Shugart and Javier Gonzalez First Strike: China’s military Threat to U.S. Bases in East Asia Center for New American Security “For a preemptive strike on U.S. forces in Japan, the PLA demonstrated the precision strike capability and missile inventory it would need to strike every U.S. ship in port, more than 200 grounded U.S. aircraft; and all major fixed headquarters, logistics facilities, and runways in U.S. airbases.” (p. 13) 2017 年 6 月 Thomas Shugart(長期任職美國海軍，包括擔任核潛艦長及國防部淨評估辦公室成員) Javier Gonzalez(長期任職海軍，曾任驅逐艦長) 第一擊:中共對美國東亞基地的軍事威脅新美國安全中心發表如對美軍駐日基地實施先發打擊，解放軍已證明它的精準打擊能力與飛彈儲量足夠打擊美國駐日所有軍艦，200 架以上地面戰機，和所有主要的固定指揮所、後勤設施、以及基地上的跑道。 (頁 13) 7 December 2017 David Ochmanek et al. U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning RAND Corporation “...the U.S. now fields forces that are, at once, larger than needed to fight a single major war, failing to keep pace with the modernizing forces of great-power adversaries, poorly postured to meet key challenges in Europe and East Asia, and insufficiently trained and ready to get the most operational utility for many of its active component units. Put more starkly, assessments in this report will show that the U.S. forces could, under plausible assumptions, lose the next war they are called upon to fight, despite the U.S outspending China on military forces by a ratio of 2.7:1 and Russia by 6:1.” (p. xii) “In conclusion, our assessment of a future clash of arms with China suggests that ... in the 2020 timeframe and beyond, U.S. and allied forces would have to fight for advantages that, until now, they have been taken for granted ... The U.S. and allied decision-makers could lose confidence in the ability of U.S. forces to defeat aggression. Potential adversaries could be correspondingly emboldened to resort to coercion or aggression to up-end the status-quo in East Asia and South-East Asia.” (pp. 18-19) 8 2017 年 12 月 David Ochmanek(曾任國防部副助理部長)、Peter A. Wilson(曾任英國外交部亞太司長、駐巴西、荷蘭大使)等 5 人因應危險世界的美國軍力:反思美國的軍力計畫蘭德公司報告美國當前軍力超過打一場大戰的需要，卻不能與現代化大國對手的軍力同步，軍力配置也難同時應付歐洲及東亞的挑戰，訓練與戰備不足也讓許多常備單位不能發揮最佳戰力。講得更直白點，本報告的評估顯示，在某些特定假設下，美國可能會輸掉下一場戰爭，儘管美國國防預算是中國的 2.7 倍，俄國的 6 倍。(頁 xii) 綜上以觀，我們對未來美中軍事衝突的評估是...在 2020 年及未來，美國與其盟邦過去視為理所當然的優勢，現在都要費力才能取得...美國與盟邦的決策者可能對美國擊退侵略者的能力失去信心。潛在對手將更大膽訴諸施壓或侵略來改變東亞與東南亞的現狀。 9 November 2018 Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead, et al. Providing for Common Defense: the Assessment and Recommendation of the National Defense Strategy Commission United States Institute of Peace “The United States confronts a grave crisis of national security and national defense... (Because) of foreign and domestic factors, America’s longstanding military advantages have diminished. The country’s strategic margin for error has become distressingly small. Doubts about America’s ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat opponents and honor its global commitments have proliferated. Previous congressionally mandated reports, such as the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel and the 2014 National Defense Panel, warned that this crisis was coming. The crisis has now arrived, with potential dire effects not just for U.S. global influence, but also for the security and welfare of America itself.” (p. 1) “If the U.S. had to fight Russia in a Baltic contingency or China in a war over Taiwan, Americans could face a decisive military defeat.” (p. 14) (If )“In2024,ChinaundertakesasurpriseattacktopreventTaiwan from declaring independence. As Chinese forces launch air and missile attacks, cripple the Taiwanese Navy, and conduct amphibious landings, it becomes clear that decisive U.S. intervention will be required. Unfortunately, America can no longer mount such an intervention at acceptable cost. China’s missile, air, surface, and undersea capabilities have continued to grow as U.S. defense spending has stagnated. Large parts of the Western Pacific have become “no-go” zones for U.S. forces. The Pentagon informs the President that American could probably defeat China in a long war, if the full might of the nation was mobilized. Yet it would lose huge numb